What follows is my complete project for my FYE class. If you don't feel up to reading the whole thing (and I certainly don't blame you) here's the condensed version: The Commies were bad and the US was pretty bad...but ya know...we were all kinda bad. So, it's time we recover and get back to business. Or, for those of you Vonnegut fans: "Everything was beautiful and nothing hurt."
Preface
In February of 1917 something was happening in Russia that would fundamentally alter world politics and, ultimately, determine U.S. foreign policy for the next 90 years. This event, the Bolshevik Revolution, began in the streets, among the angered labor force of the once great Russian Empire. The Bolsheviks would, in time, make their way to the lavish palaces of the high aristocracy, tearing down centuries of accumulated excess. The revolution, pushed by popular sentiment, hunger, and oppression, would only come fully to bear at the Winter Palace, where after protracted resistance; the Czar’s government would finally surrender. Here “the people” made their stand. Here, the Czarist monarchy, which had stood for generations, would meet its bitter end. Eventually, through the work of Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Leon Trotsky, and Alexander Kerensky, the Russian Empire would become the United Soviet Socialist Republics (Massie 764-766).
At the same time, across an ocean, a very different revolution was taking place. In 1917, the United States stood on the precipice of war in Europe. Raking in great dividends from war loans to the Allies, and making nearly two billion dollars in war contracts with their brethren across the Atlantic, the United States was prospering. With the Russian state officially withdrawn from the war, the German divisions of the Eastern Front were pushed to the Western Front where they bolstered the German lines. Now that Germany had the “upper hand” in the Great War, U.S. involvement seemed necessary for the preservation of England and France (Massie 532).
Urged by American capitalists and justified by a series of German blunders (the Zimmerman telegram, the sinking of the Lusitania, and, in general, Germany’s declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare) President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war on April 6, 1917 and officially entered the Great War on the side of the Allies. Upon entering the war, capitalism, while already a force in American industrialism, was proclaimed (unofficially) the standard in regards to American economic and political structure. It can be argued that, without the collective might of the capitalists and industrialists, the United States would never have been able to make war on Germany (Massie 528-553). After the war, President Wilson would marshal the United States into the image of “super power” and “protector of republicanism” through his famous Fourteen Points. Promising self determination to all colonies of empire, Wilson would set the standard for United States intervention. Later, Wilson’s “Open Door” would be the opening through which the United States would see the Cold War. From the end of World War II to the collapse of the Berlin Wall the United States would attempt to make good on Wilson’s promise at the end of the Great War: All nations have the right to determine how they will be governed (Cox and Kennedy-Pipe 97-8).
A Cold War Turned Hot
Fast forward twenty six years, and the United States and the USSR are embroiled in a conflict which will shape not only their own development, but the development of their fellow countries. These fellow countries: the battlefields, upon which capitalism and communism shall wage war, will be fundamentally altered economically, socially, and politically. Indeed, this overarching conflict between super powers continues to affect international relations to this day for better, and for worse.
Fundamentally, the United States and Soviet Union were different. While much of this fundamental difference is based in their economic and political ideologies, the two countries were also different socially and culturally. A relative fledgling of popular government, the people of the USSR had only been in control of their own government affairs for twenty-eight years. Comparatively, the people of the United States had been involved in their own government affairs since the late 18th century. While the Soviet Union may not actually have promoted popular government (Stalin could be regarded as the archetypal tyrant) in its first decade of life, it gradually became more focused on popular consent like the United States. Socially, the Soviet Union operated a closed system; little freedoms existed for the people of the Soviet Union, even at its most democratic moments (Kennan). In contrast, the United States regarded freedom with, perhaps, a singular obsession, representing such obsession with rights and liberties in every aspect of society, from the media, to religious institutions. The United States also drew heavily from Enlightenment philosophers in its political construction. The rights of man, envisioned by Voltaire and John Locke, and the division of government as promoted by Jean Jacques Rousseau stood at the forefront of the United States’ political infrastructure. Additionally, the United States was constructed around a capitalist system praised by Ayn Rand, John Maynard Keynes, Adam Smith, and, to a lesser extent, Bertrand Russell. Comparatively, the Soviet Union drew on more modern thinkers like Vladimir Lenin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Karl Marx, and Frederick Engels, who collectively advocated a communist society founded upon selflessness and class equality.
Both the Soviet Union and the United States were founded upon idealistic bases which formed the center of their differences. The Soviet Union in the Cold War operated under the philosophy that its form of government, namely communism, was a gift that should be shared with all countries. According to George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram, this policy was perpetuated by a belief that the USSR should be “in constant war with capitalism”. Since the United States was, perhaps arguably, the largest and most powerful capitalist state, it goes without saying that the USSR, according to its “holy war” against capitalism, would regard the United States as its mortal enemy (Kennan). Comparatively, the United States operated partly upon its World War I promotion of “self determination” for all nations and partly in favor of its own business interests. If communism were to spread the world over, the United States would have no trading partners. Without trading partners the very structure of capitalism, based upon free trade, would collapse taking the American democracy with it.
How did the USA and USSR, bonded allies during World War II, grow to despise each other? This is a troubling question, and one which has no true answer. Perhaps one of the most likely answers is that the amalgam of differences and similarities between both the USA and USSR, coupled with both countries rapid increase in military efficiency and production drove both nations into a kind of reciprocal fear and paranoia of nuclear holocaust. Recently, however, a new theory has developed that centers both on the construction of post World War II alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) and on the American aid package to post World War II Europe (dubbed the Marshall Plan).
In his paper entitled “A New History of Cold War Alliances”, Vojtech Mastny states that the formation of the Warsaw Pact (a confederation of communist/pseudo-communist states in the Eastern Bloc) was in direct confrontation to the growing danger which NATO posed to the USSR. In effect, Mastny argues that the Warsaw Pact may have actively prevented the eruption of a nuclear World War III by simply remaining in existence and on the side of the Soviets. A nuclear war, initiated by NATO and the United States would be forced to contend, not just with the Soviet Union, but also the added destructive power of the Warsaw Pact. Mastny references, as an example, the Berlin Crisis in which he asserts that both superpowers believed that their alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) could work out their differences without involving the USA and USSR. Mastny asserts, however, that this was not thoroughly thought out and the two superpowers were closer than they imagined to all out war. (Mastny 60-67)
In addition to the influence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Marshall Plan held tremendous clout in the growing schism between the USA and USSR. In a joint paper entitled “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan”, Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, pose the idea that the American aid package to Europe in the post World War II era served more as a way to alienate the USSR than as a gesture of good will to the war torn Europeans. Essentially (as Cox and Kennedy-Pipe assert) the Marshall Plan was instituted to protect Europe from falling, due to its economic destitution, to the allure of communism. Taking the cue from George F. Kennan’s “Long Telegram”, the United States’ government believed it crucial to revive Europe economically or risk losing the region to the communism of the USSR (Cox and Kennedy-Pipe 109). It was in this vein (stabbing the USSR while strengthening its neighbors against communist ideology) that the United States all but officially excluded the Soviet Union from the Marshall Plan. In fact, the United States offered the Soviet Union participation in the plan. It came as no surprise to anyone, however, when the USSR turned it down (Cox and Kennedy-Pipe 109). The implementation of the Marshall Plan, therefore (as supported by Cox and Kennedy-Pipe) was a fundamental move in deepening the schism between the USSR and USA.
With their inherent differences (cultural, political, economic, etc.), coupled with the implementation of the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the United States and Soviet Union were, perhaps, destined to meet on the battlefield to settle their differences.
On August 2, 1964, with several indirect conflicts already under their belts, the United States and Soviet Union, squared off for supremacy on the world stage. On August 2nd on a routine reconnaissance operation in the Gulf of Tonkin, the USS Maddox was attacked by several North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Surviving with minimal damage the Maddox returned on the 4th with the USS Turner Joy for backup (Atwood 2).
While the incident is still disputed, the Turner Joy and Maddox claimed to have been attacked again by two North Vietnamese vessels (this time destroyers) without provocation. With this ‘justification’ President Lyndon B. Johnson asked Congress for a resolution that would allow the United States to intervene in Vietnam. In accordance with the unprovoked attack, and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty which the United States was obligated to uphold, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 7, 1964 (Johnson). This resolution allowed the United States to intervene in Vietnam without an official declaration of war, a practice which is now carried out by the United States government on a more regular basis than a congressional declaration of war. According to the Merriam Webster dictionary this process is known as a “police action” and is carried out “without formal declaration of war by regular armed forces against persons (such as guerrillas or aggressors) held to be violators of international peace and order” (“police action”). Such ‘actions’ made up the bulk of US conflict and intervention during the Cold War.
With the congressional resolution in hand, the United States military was able to legally intervene in Vietnam and protect the interests of its ally, South Vietnam. By 1965 the United States had dispatched combat forces to the area with the distinct goal of pushing the pro-communist North Vietnamese out of the country. Unfortunately, the North Vietnamese were led by the enigmatic Ho Chi Minh and were being liberally funded by the USSR. Initiating a guerilla war with the United States, Ho Chi Minh and his nationalist army constructed a trail from North Vietnam to the South which allowed the Vietcong to smuggle weapons through Cambodia and Laos to the South Vietnamese guerillas (Atwood 2).
The Ho Chi Minh Trail ignored the boundaries of traditional warfare, pushing the conflict into a nearby state without the consent of that nearby state’s government. Intelligence gathered on the ‘trail’ led U.S. military commanders to order an increase in aerial bombardment of the region. With little consent from the Laotian and Cambodian government the United States increased the scale of its air operations in Vietnam and began to bomb the trail inside and outside of Vietnam. As a result, relations between the United States and Cambodia and Laos became strained (Atwood 2-3). However, with victories in North Vietnamese territory and the ‘destruction of the trail’ by the USAF, the United States believed it was close to a decisive victory. General Westmoreland declared that the U.S. had reached the point where the “end comes into view”.
Westmoreland and the U.S. were wrong. North Vietnamese forces under Ho Chi Minh increased their efforts, and on the Lunar New Year (Tet) initiated a surprise offensive on the United States military. The Tet Offensive, while eventually pushed back, represented to the American people a ‘failure’ of the United States military establishment to read the course of the war. As such, public outcry against the war soared, despite continued military success (Atwood 4). Additionally, the free media, a treasured liberty of American social infrastructure, captured the hell and torment of daily life at the Demilitarized Zone and in the jungles of Vietnam. Under extreme pressure and psychological distress many Marines became progressively more brutal and cruel in the pursuance of the enemy (Atwood 4).
On March 16th 1968, the My Lai massacre which resulted in the deaths of ~400 innocent Vietnamese incited further outrage in the States and, together with Johnson’s slipping public support, increasing U.S. casualties, and declining international approval, the South Vietnamese offered peace to the North. With the United States mediating the Paris Peace Accord in 1973, North and South Vietnam declared peace. However, the peace was only an illusion. The United States’ failure to resupply the South Vietnamese army with weapons in case of further North Vietnamese aggression effectively abandoned the South to the mercies of the North. In that same year, the conflict reignited and, this time, without the support of the United States, the South fell easily under the USSR funded boot of the North Vietnamese (Atwood 4-5).
In 1975, the United States evacuated its embassy in Saigon, abandoning its former South Vietnamese ally and undoubtedly straining diplomatic relations with the governments of South East Asia. The abandonment of South Vietnam and its subsequent surrender to the North showed the power of Cold War conflict. While fairly balanced militarily without international interference, the conflict between the North and the South might have been settled through primarily diplomatic means. However, with military aid from the United States and the USSR, both sides believed it possible to overwhelm the other, and, as such, both sides met on the battlefield. As a result, casualties were catastrophic. In an article for the online encyclopedia, Encarta, Dr. Paul Atwood estimated that nearly “3.2 million Vietnamese were killed, in addition to another 1.5 million to 2 million Lao and Cambodians.” Near the end of his article, Dr. Atwood depicts the devastation of post war Vietnam:
“About 10 percent of all bombs and shells went unexploded and continued to kill and maim throughout the region long after the war, as did buried land mines. Vietnam developed high rates of birth defects, probably due to the use of Agent Orange and other chemical defoliants. The defoliants used during the war also destroyed about 15 percent of South Vietnam’s valuable timber resources and contributed to a serious decline in rice and fish production, the major sources of food for Vietnam. There were 800,000 orphans created in South Vietnam alone. At least 10 million people became homeless refugees in the south. Vietnam’s government punished those Vietnamese who had been allied with the United States by sending thousands to ‘reeducation camps’ and depriving their families of employment. These measures, combined with economic hardships throughout Vietnam, led to the exodus of about 1.3 million people, most as refugees to the United States.” (5)
Despite the horrific destruction in Vietnam, the United States also suffered heavy losses, though less epic in scope. Dr. Atwood states in his article that nearly 58,000 servicemen and women lost their lives in the war and those that returned to the States were often met with hostility and general distaste by the largely anti-war American populace.
Unfortunately, the Vietnam War was not the last conflict between the USSR and USA. In December of 1979 military forces from the USSR invaded Afghanistan in support of pro-communist government factions. Until the Soviet invasion the Afghani government was constructed around a kind of joint rule between Nur Mohammad Taraki (a military commander and communist) and Hafizullah Amin (the more popular leader). The anti-communist forces in Afghanistan (who made up a clear majority of the population) had protested the rise of Taraki to power and, since 1978, had been fighting a guerilla war against the communists in their country. This anti-communist force would be known collectively as the Mujahideen. On December 24, 1979, the Soviet Union, at the request of Taraki and communist officials in the Afghan government, invaded Afghanistan with 30,000 troops. Hafizullah Amin was toppled and a new puppet leader installed (Grau).
Believing the task to be completed the Soviet military focused on training the Afghan army to defend itself against the Mujahideen without the aid of Soviet troops. Initially the Soviet trained Afghan army did well at crushing the resistance of the Mujahideen forcing many opposition leaders out of the country into neighboring Pakistan (Grau). This exile into Pakistan of opposition leaders is still present today with a large concentration of terrorist cells (former and current members of the Mujahideen) still operating out of the mountains of Pakistan (Bajoria).
Seeing this Soviet intrusion from his position on the House Appropriations Committee on Defense, Congressman Charles Wilson requested an increase in funding to the Mujahideen resistance movement. As shown in both the movie (Nichols), and the (more factual) book by George Crile, CIA operative Gust Avrakotos approached Representative Wilson (in direct violation of CIA protocol) in order to request further funding for the Afghan resistance. Wilson granted his request and appropriated, with the approval of Congress, an additional fifty million dollars to the Mujahideen (Nichols).
Congressman Wilson’s efforts were not in vain. With aid and weapons from the United States, the Mujahideen was able to mount an effective guerilla war against the Soviets, a true reversal of the roles in the Vietnam War. Lester Grau supports this theory, “The United States, smarting from the support that the Soviet Union had provided North Vietnam and the Vietcong during the Vietnam War, looked on aid [to the Mujahideen] as a way of reciprocating and giving the Soviet Union ‘a bloody nose’” (Grau).
Facing extreme resistance from the Mujahideen the Soviet military attempted to “reinvent their tactics in the middle of the conflict”. Unfortunately for the Soviets, this was a doomed process. As Grau states, “in a guerilla war the side with the highest moral commitment will hold the ground at the end of the conflict” (Grau). As the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was largely kept secret from the population of the USSR the Soviets lacked both the advantages and disadvantages of popular support (as illustrated by the United States in Vietnam). Additionally, the Mujahideen were fighting both for their freedom from political oppression inside Afghanistan, and against the invasion by the Soviet Union. It is fair to say then, that the Mujahideen possessed much greater “moral commitment” than the Soviet Union.
In February 1989, the Soviet Union, facing the breakdown of its state at home and an interminable conflict in Afghanistan, (which was beginning to appear similar to the United States’ conflict in Vietnam) pulled out of the country after signing the Geneva Accords. The destruction left behind the treads of the Soviet tanks was almost unfathomable. Millions had died; Afghan society was in shambles, the country’s very people were displaced, living abroad in countries across the globe (Grau). Lester Grau describes the damage caused by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan at the end of his paper entitled “The Soviet Afghan War”:
Afghanistan lost over 1.3 million people, the bulk of them civilians, in pursuit of this war…The economy was shattered, the population was scattered in neighboring refugee camps and across the globe. Society was shattered. [Afghanistan] was no longer a liberal Islamic country under secular rule. Tribal law and morals no longer controlled the rural youth. Now Afghanistan had a fundamentalist Islamic orientation and was rife with schism and lawlessness. The Mujahideen was no longer an unpaid volunteer. Now, he was the man with the gun who could take what he desired. Anarchy rocked the nation and threatened its neighbors. Pre-war Afghanistan may have had a 10% literacy rate [after the war, even lower]. Farming was at a standstill due to the loss of irrigation systems, orchards and vineyards. Mines and unexploded ordnance cluttered the fields. Warlords battled warlords as Afghanistan took the position as one of the poorest countries on the planet—the country that led the world in infant mortality and death in childbirth. The Mujahideen could claim victory, but it was a hollow victory indeed—a victory that eventually spawned the Taliban movement and the bloodiest ethnic civil war in Afghanistan’s history. (par. 63)
Not only was the Soviet-Afghan War devastating to Afghanistan but the Soviet Union, crippled further by this prolonged war, succumbed in 1990 to political collapse, officially ending the USSR (Grau). Clearly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a brutal conflict that aptly demonstrates the destructive power of the various hot wars of the Cold War.
It is easy, from a nationalist standpoint to blame one country or another for the destruction caused by the Cold War and the resulting international turmoil that we deal with to this day, and to some degree this should be expected. However, it is clear that, despite their (perhaps, best) intentions, the United States and Soviet Union are, perhaps, fairly equal in guilt. The destruction caused by the United States in the ‘police action’ of Vietnam and its subsequent abandonment of the South Vietnamese, destroyed Vietnam’s fragile farm-based economy, left the communist and anti-communist conflict unresolved in government, deepened the social and cultural divide between the North and South Vietnamese, and even, ecologically “firebombed” the Vietnamese jungles with Agent Orange. Only now, years later, has Vietnam been able to creep slowly towards recovery. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan destroyed the fragile Afghan political structure, killed millions of Afghanis, displaced millions more, and destroyed infrastructure, education, and led to the general decay of law and order. While the battles of the Cold War may have ceased with the destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1990, the generations that follow have and must continue to lead their respective countries along the path to global recovery.
